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,"inPresident's Corn- All prescriptions of behavior for individuals require enforcement.
of Justice. Organized Usually the obligation to behave in a prescribed way is entered into
Government Printing voluntarily by explicit or implicit contract. For example, I promise to
teach certain classes with designated frequency and to discuss matters
Back Up the Police." which I, and possibly others, believe are relevant to the course titles. By
negotiation, and in the event of its failure, by legal action, I and my em-
alysis." MA. thesis, ployer seek to enforce the contract of employment against large depar-
tures from the promised behavior. Performance of some kinds of behavior
Case of Electncity." is difficult or impossible to enforce—such as promises to be creative,
noble, or steadfast in crisis—and as a result such contractual promises conomy 72 (February .
areeither not made or enforced only when there is an uncontroversially
Journa! of Laui'and flagrant violation. The influence upon contract, and upon economic
organization generally, of the costs of enforcing various kinds of contracts
adelphia: J. B. Lippin- has received virtually no study by economists, despite its immense poten-
tial explanatory power.
When the prescribed behavior is fixed unilaterally rather than by indi-
vidual agreement, we have the regulation or law, and enforcement of
these unilateral rules is the subject of the present essay. Departures of
actual from prescribed behavior are crimes or violations, although one
could wish for a less formidable description than "criminal" to describe56 THE OPTIMUM ENFORCEMENT OF LAWS
many of the trifling offenses or the offenses against unjust laws. My
primary purpose is to construct a theory of rational enforcement, a theory
which owes much to Gary Becker's major article on the subject (1968). in
the conclusion the problem of explanation, as distinguished from prescrip-
tion, will be commented upon.
I. THE GOAL OF ENFORCEMENT
The goal of enforcement, let us assume, is to achieve that degree of com-
pliance with the rule of prescribed (or proscribed) behavior that the
society believes it can afford. There is one decisive reason why the so-
ciety must forego "complete" enforcement of the rule: enforcement is
costly.
The extent of enforcement of laws depends upon the amount of re-
sources devoted to the task. With enough policemen, almost every speed-
ing automobile could be identified. The success of tenacious pursuit of
the guilty in celebrated crimes (such as the great English train robbery
and the assassination of Martin King) suggests that few crimes of sane
men could escape detection. We could make certain that crime does not
pay by paying enough to apprehend most criminals. Such a level of en-
forcement would of course he enormously expensive, and only in crimes
of enormous importance will such expenditures be approached. The
society will normally give to the enforcement agencies a budget which
dictates a much lower level of enforcement.
The cost limitation upon the enforcement of laws would prevent the
society from forestalling, detecting, and punishing all offenders, but it
would appear that punishments which would be meted out to the guilty
could often be increased without using additional resources. The offender
is deterred by the expected punishment, which is (as a first approxima-
tion) the probability of punishment times the punishment—$ 100 if the
probability of conviction is 1/10 and the fine $1,000. Hence, increasing
the punishment would seem always to increase the deterrence. Capital
punishment is cheaper than long term imprisonment; and seizure of all
the offender's property may not be much more expensive than collecting
a more moderate fine.
To escape from this conclusion, Becker introduces as a different limi-
tation on punishment the "social value of the gain to offenders" from the
offense. The determination of this social value is not explained, and one
is entitled to doubt its usefulness as an explanatory concept: what evi-
dence is there that society sets a positive value upon the utility derived
from a murder, rape, or arson? In fact the society has branded the utility
derived from such act
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gain to the offender is viewed as a gain to society,' but such social gains
seem too infrequent, small, and capricious to put an effective limitation
upon the size of punishments.
Instead we take account of another source of limitation of punish-
ment, which arises out of the nature of the supply of offenses. It is no
doubt true that the larger the punishment, the smaller will be the ex-
pected net utility to the prospective offender from the commission of a
given offense. But marginal decisions are made here as in the remainder
of life, and the marginal deterrence of heavy punishments could be very
small or even negative. If the offender will be executed for a minor as-
sault and for a murder, there is no marginal deterrence to murder. if the
thief has his hand cut off for taking five dollars, he had just as well take
$5,000. Marginal costs are necessary to marginal deterrence.2 The
marginal deterrence to committing small crimes is also distorted if an
otherwise appropriate schedule of penalties is doubled or halved.
One special aspect of this cost limitation upon enforcement is the
need to avoid overenforcement. The enforcement agency could easily
apprehend most guilty people if we placed no limits upon the charging
and frequent conviction of innocent people. in any real enforcement
system, there will in fact be conviction and punishment of some innocent
parties, and these miscarriages of justice impose costs of both resources
and loss of confidence in the enforcement machinery. The costs of
defense of innocent parties, whether borne by themselves or by the state,
are part of the costs of enforcement from the social viewpoint. The con-
viction of innocent persons encourages the crime because it reduces the
marginal deterrence to its commission.
The significance of an offense to society —thequantity of resources
that will be used to "prevent" the offense—will in general increase with
the gravity of the offense. The increase in resources, however, will not
manifest itself only in an increase in punishments. The state will pursue
more tenaciously the offender who commits a larger crime (or repeti-
1.For example, the thief reduces the welfare expenditures of the state, or the arsonist
warms the neighboring houses.
2. Becker writes the expected utility from an offense as EU=pU(Y—f)+(l—p)U(Y),
whereY is the money value of the gain, p the probability of detection and conviction, and
f the fine. (The income, Y,andfine,f, must be interpreted as average annual flows; for a
single offense Ymustbe less than f.)Ifthis expression is differentiated partially with re-
specttoY, —p)U'(Y)U'(Y)—pfU'(Y), whichisposi-
tive for all Y.Ofcourse p and fwillincrease with Ytoprevent this incitement to larger
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tive crimes) and thus increase also the probability of apprehending him.
There is a division of labor between the state and the citizen in the
prevention of virtually every offense. The owner of large properties is
required to do much of his direct policing: there are surely more watch-
men and guards than policemen in a typical city. The larger accumula-
tions of wealth, moreover, are to be guarded by the owner through devices
such as nonnegotiability and custody of funds by specialists. Accordingly,
the pub/icpunishmentsfor crimes against property do not increase in
proportion to the value of the property. In the protection of people, as
distinguished from their property, the individual is required to protect
himself from minor offenses or at least to detect their occurrence and
assume a large part of the burden of prosecution (for example, shop-
lifting, insults, simple trespass), but he is allowed less discretion in prose-
cution for major assaults.
The relationship of duration and nature of penalties to age and sex of
offender, frequency of previous offenses, and so forth is also explicable
in terms of cost of enforcement. The first-time offender may have com-
mitted the offense almost accidentally and (given any punishment) with
negligible probability of repetition, so heavy penalties (which have
substantial costs to the state) are unnecessary. The probability of a rep-
etition of an offense by a seasoned offender is also zero during his
imprisonment, so the probability of repetition of an offense is relevant
to the penalty also in his case.
Indeed, the problem of determining the efficient penalty may be
viewed as one in statistical inference: to estimate the individual's average,
durable propensity to offend (the population value) on the basis of a
sample of his observed behavior and how this propensity responds to
changes in penalties. As in other sequential sampling problems, one can
estimate this propensity more accurately, the longer the individual's
behavior is observed.
The society will be more concerned (because each individual is more
concerned) with major than minor offenses in the foUowing sense: there
is increasing marginal disutility of offenses, so a theft of $1,000 is more
than twice as harmful as a theft of $500. In the area of offenses to prop-
erty, this result is implied by diminishing marginal utility of income. In
the area of offenses to persons, it is more difficult to measure damage in
any direct way, but a similar rule probably holds.
So much for prevention and punishment; let us turn to the offenses.
II. THE SUPPLY
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The commission of offenses will be an act of production for income or an
act of consumption. A consumption offense would be illustrated by
speeding in an automobile used for recreation or assaulting a courtship
rival (when the girl is poor). A production offense would be illustrated
by theft, smuggling, and the violation of economic regulations. In the
realm of offenses to property, income objectives are of course paramount,
and we may recall Adam Smith's emphasis upon the economic nature of
crime:
The affluence of the rich excites the indignation of the poor, who are often both
driven by want, and prompted by envy, to invade his possessions. It is only under
the shelter of the civil magistrate that the owner of that valuable property, which
is acquired by the labour of many years, or perhaps of many successive genera-
tions, can sleep a single night in security. He is at all times surrounded by un-
known enemies, whom, though he never provoked, he can never appease, and
from whose iniustice he can be protected only by the powerful arm of the civil
magistrate continually held up to chastise it. The acquisition of valuable and
extensive property, therefore, necessarily requires the establishment of civil
government. Where there is no property, or at least none that exceeds the value
of two or three days labour, civil government is not so necessary (Smith, 1937,
p. 670).
The professional criminal seeks income, and for him the usual rules
of occupational choice will hold. He will reckon the present value of the
expected returns and costs of the criminal activity and compare their
difference with the net returns from other criminal activities and from
legitimate activities. The costs of failure in the execution of the crime
correspond to the costs of failure in other occupations. The costs of
injuries to a professional athlete are comparable to the costs to the
offender of apprehension, defense, and conviction, but normally legal oc-
cupations have only monetary costs of failure.
The details of occupational choice in illegal activity are not different
from those encountered in the legitimate occupations. One must choose
the locality of maximum income expectation (and perhaps, like a sales-
man, move from area to area). One must choose between large, relatively
infrequent crimes and smaller, more frequent crimes. One must reckon
in periods of (involuntary) unemployment due to imprisonment. Earnings
can be expected to rise for a time with experience.60 THE OPTIMUM ENFORCEMENT OF LAWS
The probability of apprehension (and therefore of conviction) is an
increasing function of the frequency of commission of offenses. If the
probability of detection is p for one offense, it is 1 —(1—p)11for at least
one conviction in 11offenses,and this expression approaches unity as n
becomeslarge. In fact, the probability of detection (p) rises after each
apprehension because the enforcement agency is also learning the offend-
er's habits. On this score alone, there is a strong incentive to the criminal
to make very infrequent attempts to obtain very large sums of money.
The probability of success is also affected by the precautions of the
prospective victim: Fort Knox is more difficult to enter than a liquor
store. The efforts of detection will also increase with the size of the
offense.
We may postulate, in summary, a supply of offenses which in
equilibrium has the following properties:
1. Net returns are equalized, allowance being made for risk and
costs of special equipment required for various activities.
2. The determinants of supply which are subject to the control of
society are: (a) the structure of penalties by offense; (b) the
probability of detection for each offense; (c) certain costs of the
conduct of the offending activity; for example, the cost of making
successful counterfeit money can be increased by complicating
the genuine money.
3. The penalties and chances of detection and punishment must be
increasing functions of the enormity of the offense.
Although it smacks of paradox, it may be useful to reinterpret the
offending activity as providing a variety of products (offenses). These
offenses are in a sense demanded by the society: my wallet is an invita-
tion to the footpad, my office funds to the embezzler. The costs of pro-
duction of the offenses are the ordinary outlays of offenders plus the
penalties imposed by the society. The industry will operate at a scale
and composition of output set by the competition of offenders and the
cost of producing offenses.
The structure of rational enforcement activities will have these
properties:
I. Expected penalties increase with expected gains so there is no
marginal net gain from larger offenses. Let the criminal commit
in a year S crimes of size Q,whereQisthe monetary value to the
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(p) of crimes completed successfully (or the probability of suc-
cessful completion of one crime) is a decreasing function of the
amount of expenditure (E) undertaken by society to prevent and
punish the crime. (Punishment is used for deterrence, and is only
a special form of prevention.) Hence p =p(E,Q),orpossibly
p =p(E,Q,S).The expected punishment is the fraction of crimes
apprehended (and punished) times the punishment, F. The condi-
tion for marginal deterrence is, for all Q,d(pSQ)/dQd(l —
p)SFIdQ.
2.The expenditures on prevention and enforcement should yield a
diminution in offenses, at the margin, equal to the return upon
these resources in other areas. An increment of expenditures
yields a return in reduced offenses,
d(pSQ')/dE =marginalreturn on expenditures elsewhere,
where Q'isthe monetary value of the offense to society.3
I do not include foregone lawful services of the criminal in the cost of his
activity to society (=noncriminals)since he, not others, would receive
the return (taxes aside!) if he shifted from crime to a lawful occupation.
111. THE ENFORCEMENT AGENCY:
A NORMATIVE APPROACH
A law is enforced, not by "society," but by an agency instructed to that
task. That agency must be given more than a mandate (an elegant ad-
monition) to enforce the statute with vigor and wisdom: it must have
incentives to enforce the law efficiently. There are at least two deficiencies
in the methods by which most agencies are induced to enforce the laws
properly.
The first deficiency is that the enforcement agency does not take into
account, at least explicitly and fully, the costs it imposes upon the activity
or persons regulated. In the area of ordinary criminal offenses, the society
will, if anything, wish to increase (at no expense to itself) the costs of
defense for guilty persons, but it should not impose costs (and certainly
not unnecessary costs) upon innocent parties. In fact, the administration
of criminal justice should in principle include as a cost the reimbursement
3. Currency has the same value to the criminal as to society, so Q' =Q.But for any
commodity which does not have a market price independent of ownership, Q <Q'.62 THE OPTIMUM ENFORCEMENT OF LAWS
of the expenses of defense of people charged and acquitted. The com-
pensation actually paid will not exactly compensate injured persons,
because of the administrative costs of ascertaining exact compensation,
but the taking of an innocent person's personal wealth, including foregone
income, differs in no respect from the taking of some of his real estate (for
which under eminent domain it is necessary to compensate him fully).4
In the area of economic regulation, guilt is often an inappropriate
notion, and when it is inappropriate all costs of compliance must be
reckoned into the social costs of enforcement. The utility's costs in
preparing a rate case or Texas Gulf Sulfur's Costs in defending itself
against the Securities and Exchange Commission are social costs of the
regulatory process. Reimbursement is now achieved by charging the con-
sumers of the products and the owners of specialized resources of these
industries: they bear the private costs of the regulatory process. This is at
least an accidental allocation of costs, and when the regulation seeks to
aid the poorer consumers or resource owners, a perverse allocation.
The second deficiency in the design of enforcement is the use of in-
appropriate methods of determining the extent of enforcement. The
annual report of an enforcement agency is in effect the justification of its
previous expenditures and the plea for enlarged appropriations. The
Federal Trade Commission will tell us, for example, that in fiscal 1966 as
part of its duty to get truthful labeling of furs and textiles, it inspected
1 2,625 plants and settled 213 "cases" for $ 1,272,000 plus overhead. The
agency may recite scandals corrected or others still unrepressed, but it
neither offers nor possesses a criterion by which to determine the correct
scale of its activities.
A rational measure of enforcement procedure could in principle be
established in almost any area. Consider the fraudulent labeling of textiles.
We could proceed as follows:
1. The damage to the consumer from the purchase of a mislabeled
textile could be estimated, and will obviously vary with the mis-
labeling (assuming that the legal standards are sensible!). The
difference between market value of the true and alleged grades is
one component of the damage. A second and more elusive compo-
nent is the additional cost of deception (earlier replacement, skin
irritation, and so forth): the consumer who would not have pur-
chased the inferior quality at a competitive price had he known its
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damage is the amount a consumer would pay to avoid the decep-
tion, that is, the value of the insuredcorrectquality minus the
value of the actual quality.
2. As a matter of deterrence, the penalties on the individual mis-
labeler should be equal to a properly taken sum of the following
items: (a) The damage per yard times the number of yards, say
per year. Let this be H. (b) The costs of the enforcement agency,
say E, per year. This sum should include reimbursement of the
costs of those charged and acquitted. (c) The costs of defense (if
detected) for the mislabeler, D. Where guilt is an appropriate
notion, as presumably in the case of mislabeling, the society may
wish to ignore these costs, which is to say, resources devoted to
this end deserve no return. Where guilt is inappropriate, these
costs should be reckoned in. The sum of these penalties must be
multiplied by lip, where p is the probability of detection of the
offense within the year. This probability is a function of E and H.
3. The enforcement agency should minimize the sum of damages
plus enforcement costs,+ E) or + + E).5
Thisgoal will serve two functions. The first is to set the scale of enforce-
ment, namely where marginal return equals marginal cost. If the scale of
enforcement is correct, society is not spending two dollars to save itself
one dollar of damage, or failing to spend one dollar where it will save more
than that amount of damage. The second function is to guide the selection
of cases: the agency will not (as often now) seek numerous, easy cases to
dress up its record, but will pursue the frequent violator and the violator
who does much damage.
This sort of criterion of enforcement is readily available in certain
areas. The secret service, for example, reports that in fiscal 1967 the loss
to the public from counterfeit money was $1,658,100.75 (an excellent
instance of counterfeit accuracy). Perhaps half of the $17 million spent
by this agency was devoted to the suppression of counterfeiting, and to
this one must add the costs of legal actions, imprisonment, and so forth.
The secret service should be asking whether the amount of counterfeit
money passed would fall by a dollar if a dollar more were spent on en-
forcement costs minus the corresponding fines collected.
5. The fines will be but the fines per se are transfers rather than social costs;
see Becker (1958), pp. 180—8 1.64 THE OPTIMUM ENFORCEMENT OF LAWS
The penalty structure should incorporate the social appraisal of the
importance of the suppression of the offenses. The law does not in general
provide this scale of values, as can be shown by the list of maximum
penalties for the violations of economic regulations listed in Table I.
The use of criminal sanctions is erratic, and the implicit equivalence
of fines and imprisonment varies from $1,000 per year to $10,000 per
TABLE 1




Offense Agency Penalty Statute
Restraint of tradeAntitrust Division$50,000 + 1 yearSherman (1890,
(+ triple dam- 1955)
ages and costs)
Unfair methods ofFTC Cease and desistFTC (1914)
competition order
Refusal to testify,FTC $l,000—$5,000 +Same
or testify falsely, 1 year
under same
Price discrimina-FTC Cease and desistClayton (1914)
tion (+ triple dam-
ages and costs)
False advertise- FTC $5,000 + 6 Wheeler-Lea
ments of foods, months (1938)
drugs, or
cosmetics
Adulteration or Secretary of $1,000 + 1 year,Copeland Act






Exporting applesDept. of Denial of certifi-Apples and Pears
and pears with- Agriculture cate for 10 days;for Export
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quality knowing viola-
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Exporting applesDept. of $1 barrel Standard Barrels
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Exporting otherDept. of $500 or 6 monthsStandard Barrels
fruit or vege- Agriculture if willful ...forFruits,
tables in im- Vegetables and
proper barrels . Other Dry
Commodities
(1915)
Exporting grapesDept. of $25 Standard Baskets
in improper Agriculture Act (1916)
baskets .
Giving rebates inICC $200—$500 first Motor Carrier
freight charges offense; $250— Act (1935)
(trucks) $5,000 repeated
offense
Same, water ICC $5,000 if willful Transportation
carriers Act (1940)
Failure to discloseFRB Twice finance Consumer Credit






Falsely certify aFBI $5,000 and/or 62 Stat. 749
check 5 years (June 25, 1948)
Failure to deliverFRB Twice the numberFederal Reserve




Evasion of exciseTreasury $10,000 and/or Revenue Act





Securities Act SEC $5,000 and/or 5 Securities Act
violation years (1934)
Misbrand Secretary of $500 and 90 days;Hazardous
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year. Many of the penalties are not even stated in the statutes: the penalty
for drinking (industrial) alcohol which has not paid its beverage tax is
sometimes blindness or death. The penalties for the essentially similar
offense (if such it must be called) of reducing freight rates can be ten
times as much for a barge operator as for a trucker. Of course these maxi-
mum penalties are not actual penalties, but one is not entitled to hope for
much more rationality or uniformity in the fixing of penalties for specific
offenses. (The lawyers have apparently not studied in adequate detail the
actual sanctions for economic offenses.)
One may conjecture that two features of punishment of traditional•
criminal law have been carried over to economic regulation: the attribu-
tion of a substantial cost to the act of conviction itself, and the related
belief that moral guilt does not vary closely with the size of the offense.
Whatever the source, the penalty structure is not well designed for either
deterrence or guidance of enforcement.
IV. CONCLUSION
The widespread failure to adopt rational criteria of enforcement of laws
has been due often and perhaps ustially.to a simple lack of understanding
of the need for and nature of rational enforcement. The clarification of
the logic of rational enforcement, and the demonstration that large gains
would be obtained by shifting to a rational enforcement scheme, are
presumably the necessary (and hopefully sufficient) conditions for im-
proving public understanding of enforcement problems.6
There is, however, a second and wholly different reason for the use of
what appear to be inappropriate sanctions and inappropriate appropria-
tions to enforcement bodies: the desire of the public not to enforce the
laws. The appropriations to the enforcement agency and the verdicts of
juries are the instruments by which the community may constantly review
public policy. If the society decides that drinking alcoholic beverages or
speeding in automobiles is not a serious offense in its ordinary form,
they may curtail resources for enforcement and so compel the enforce-
ment agency to deal only with a smaller number of offenses (perhaps
offenses of larger magnitude, such as chronic drunkenness or driving at
extremely high speeds). There is considerable inertia in the legislative
6.The peculiarities of the structure of sanctions in economic regulation are partially
due also to the response of the regulated businesses. They may effectively lobby to limit
appropriations to the regulatory body, but they can also impose costly activities upon the
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costly activities upon the
process —inertiathat serves highly useful functions—andit is much easier
to make continuous marginal adjustments in a policy through the appro-
priations committee by varying the resources for its enforcement than it is
to modify the statute. Variation in enforcement provides desirable
flexibility in public policy.
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